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1Introduction
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the scoping process for the 
forthcoming NEC FUTURE Tier I EIS. 
Background 
We, the authors1 of  this comment memorandum, are members of  a transportation 
research group at the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology (MIT) directed 
by Professor Joseph Sussman. The focus of  this group, with members from 
both the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department and the Engineering 
Systems Division, is regional transportation planning with a special emphasis on 
high-speed rail. As such, and due to MIT’s location on the corridor, we pay close 
attention to progress on planning for the Northeast Corridor (NEC).
As members of  a research institution, we are energized by the potential for 
innovative solutions to emerge from the upcoming focused and detailed analysis 
of  the NEC. Given our personal and intellectual interests in the results of  this 
effort, we attended the August 13, 2012 scoping meeting in Boston, and are 
now taking this opportunity to comment. Our hope is that the NEC FUTURE 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will indeed serve as a strong basis for 
critical future upgrades along the corridor, and bring fiscal and planning efficiency 
for decades to come. The scope for this study is of  utmost importance, and will 
provide the limits of  breadth and depth to which the study will progress.
Additionally, we feel we can bring special expertise to the scoping process. 
Earlier this year our research group completed a comprehensive look at the 
complexities and challenges associated with mobility in the NEC. This submittal 
is based on a report prepared for and funded by the Institute for Transportation 
Policy Studies (ITPS) in Tokyo, Japan, entitled Transportation in the Northeast 
Corridor of  the U.S.: A Multimodal and Intermodal Conceptual Framework. Their 
support is gratefully acknowledged. Our group at MIT is wholly responsible for 
the content or any errors that occur in this text. We applied novel combinations 
of  system analysis methods to seek new insights for planning in this corridor. 
With the lessons learned from this account, we seek to provide input to the NEC 
FUTURE scoping process, and enrich the NEC FUTURE Tier I EIS study.
Areas of Focus
We recognize that the Purpose and Need and a comprehensive and carefully 
articulated range of  alternatives are of  utmost importance for the EIS process, 
and we are focusing our comments in these two areas. With the lessons learned 
from the ITPS   report, we hope to offer insights useful in formulating and 
refining the project’s Purpose and Need, and as well in defining the alternatives 
to be considered. Additional insights remain, and we would reference you to the 
entire ITPS report (see sidebar at right) for the full breadth of  our findings. 
1 Authors include: Joseph M. Sussman, Andrés F. Archila, S. Joel Carlson, Maite Peña-Alcaraz, Naomi Stein, 
and Ryan J. Westrom
Outline of Contents:
• Introduction
• Purpose and Need
• Alternatives
• Conclusion
USDOT Strategic Goals
The USDOT has 5 strategic goals:
• Safety
• State of Good Repair
• Economic Competitiveness
• Livable Communities
• Environmental Sustainability
All these goals are related 
substantively to the NEC program 
and should be taken into account.
Navigating Your Way
Resources for Further Information
The original ITPS report can be 
accessed via Professor Sussman’s 
website: http://esd.mit.edu/Faculty_Pages/
sussman/Trans-Northeast-Corridor.pdf
Throughout this memo, we will 
make use of sidebar notes to point 
towards relevant sections of the 
full ITPS report, should you wish to 
pursue an idea in more depth. 
The ITPS report addresses content 
raised here in greater depth. The 
full report:
• Offers a systems 
representation of the 
institutional and physical 
systems relevant to NEC rail
• Identifies high-impact 
paths within the systems 
representation as a guide 
towards understanding 
highly leveraged points of 
influence within the system
• Conducts a scenario analysis 
of the performance of 
various alternative under 
uncertainty
• Enumerates methods of 
designing flexibility into 
design alternatives in order 
to address uncertainty
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Corridor History
In looking forward, we believe it is vital to also look back. As Confucius said, 
“Study the past if  you would define the future.” The Northeast Corridor of  the 
United States – stretching from Boston, MA to Washington, DC (and in the 
future, possibly beyond) – is the most densely settled region and the economic 
engine in the richest country in the world, yet it has been plagued for decades 
with congestion of  all types on its roads, in the air and on its rails. It is arguably 
the most studied region in the world from a transportation perspective, but is also 
one of  the most challenging to study: for example, the rail system alone has four 
owners and nine passenger rail operators, operating on infrastructure originally 
built beginning at the turn of  the 20th century. Given the myriad studies that have 
been done, one might ask what value added there will be in yet another study of  
this vital region – vital from a regional, national and an international perspective. 
We believe, as you do, that another study is worthwhile, and continued growing 
understanding, collaboration, and refinement of  ideas and ideals will bring 
about positive change for a corridor that needs it. Ultimately, the success of  
this newest study depends on learning from the past while simultaneously being 
broad and open enough in scope to capture the complexities, both physical and 
institutional, of  the NEC transportation system.
The history of  the NEC provides insights into the challenges faced when 
attempting to upgrade a multi-state, multi-use and multi-operator corridor, 
and provides some guidance for future developments. Table 12,3 presents a 
summarized history of  development in the NEC is outlined.
2 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 1994. Final environmental impact statement/report and 4(f) 
statement: Northeast Corridor improvement project electrification-New Haven, CT to Boston, MA. U.S. 
Dept. of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Northeast Corridor Project, Washington, D.C. 
3 de Cerreño, A.L.C. and Mathur, S. 2006. High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States: Identifying the 
Elements of Success Part 2. MTI Report 06-03, Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose, CA
3 Table 1: Summarized history of development on the Northeast Corridor
 Year Description (Compiled from: FRA 1994 , and de Cerreño and Mathur 2006)   
Early 
1900s
• The Pennsylvania Railroad Company (PRR) owns the New York City to Washington, D.C. portion of the NEC, and the 
New Haven Railroad Company (NHRR) owns the New York City to Boston portion.
• The PRR constructs tunnels under the North and East Rivers to connect Manhattan to both the northern and 
southern portion of the NEC.
1914 • NHRR installs a catenary system from New York to New Haven following a steam locomotive accident around New 
York.
1917 • The Hell Gate Bridge from upstate New York to Queens is constructed.
1928 to 
1935
• The New York City to Washington, D.C. portion of the NEC is electrified.
1961 • NHRR enters bankruptcy and remains under court supervision until it is acquired by the Penn Central 
Transportation Company.
1963 • Congress establishes the NEC Project Office within the Department of Commerce.
1965 • The High-Speed Ground Transportation Act provides $51.8 million for high-speed rail demonstration projects on 
the NEC (including Metroliner [southern section] and Turbotrain [northern portion] services), and establishes the 
Office of High-Speed Ground Transportation (OHSGT), which takes over the NEC Project Office.
1967 • The United States Department of Transportation is created and takes over the OHSGT from the Department of 
Commerce.
1968 • The merger of the PRR and New York Central Railroad creates the Penn Central Transportation Company (PCT)
1969 • NHRR is acquired by the PCT.
• Metroliner service between Washington, D.C. and New York City is established. In 1975, the travel time between 
these two cities is about 3 hours, but due to poor track infrastructure, it is not able to reduce travel times further.
• Turbotrain (a train powered by jet engine technology) is placed into service on the north end of the NEC from 
Boston to New York City, but due to mechanical difficulties, it was taken out of service in 1976.
1970 • The Rail Passenger Service Act (RPSA) creates Amtrak to take over most intercity passenger rail services in the U.S.
1973 • Although primarily concerned with freight railroads, the Regional Rail Reorganization (3R) Act commissions 
engineering studies to look at improving passenger rail service.
1976 • Amtrak acquires most of the NEC as a result of provisions in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) 
Act.
• The 4R Act establishes goals for shorter rail travel times between Boston and New York City and New York City and 
Washington, D.C. of 3:40 (h:mm) and 2:40, respectively, by 1981. The authors de Cerreño and Mathur (2006) note 
that these travel time goals and corresponding funding amounts were largely set through negotiation as opposed 
to by any formal analysis.
• To achieve these goals, the 4R Act creates the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) and appropriates 
$1.75 billion for infrastructure improvement projects. This amount was later increased in 1979 to $2.5 billion as a 
result of the 1979 U.S. DOT “Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Redirection Study,” which concluded that the 
draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DPEIS) did not appear to adequately consider commuter and 
freight operations, and that the project’s scope, schedule and budget was not adequate.
1978 • The FRA’s final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS) is released. It evaluates broad options for 
upgrades to the NEC, and, in particular, considers three alternative routes.
1980 • The Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act directs the FRA to transfer management of the NECIP to Amtrak by 1985. It 
also increases the funding amounts to $2.5 billion (as described above) and lengthens the project to seven years in 
total.
1992 • The Amtrak Authorization and Development Act (AADA) commits $470 million per year to the NECIP for 1994 and 
1995, sets a statutory goal of three hour travel times between Boston and New York City and requires that a master 
plan be developed to achieve this goal.
1994 • Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña issues The Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan: New York City to 
Boston, which estimates a cost of $3.1 billion to complete the electrification of remaining portion of the NEC, 
reduce trip times to AADA requirements and generally increase capacity on the NEC.
• The FRA releases the final Environmental Impact Statement/Report (FEIS/R) for the electrification of the NEC from 
Boston to New Haven.
Late 
1990s
• Amtrak installs electrical catenary between New Haven and Boston. 
2000 • Amtrak begins (initially limited) Acela high-speed rail service on the NEC
2008 • The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) appropriates funds to Amtrak for 2009 to 2013. It also 
requires Amtrak to develop a master plan for the NEC.
2009 • The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provides around $10 billion in funding for high-speed rail 
projects around the U.S.
2010 • The NEC Infrastructure Master Plan and A Vision for High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor are released by 
Amtrak.
2012 • MIT/ITPS Transportation in the Northeast Corridor of the U.S. report is released
• MAP-21 is passed and the NEC FUTURE study is initiated
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There are a few aspects of  this history that motivate our systems approach to 
looking at the NEC. Noteworthy are the challenges faced during the late-1970s 
to define “good performance” on the NEC. In addition, there is the fluctuating 
performance of  intercity passenger rail caused by the lack of  consistent long-
term funding. While it is tempting to dismiss these challenges because they are 
often driven by the political sphere, we feel that an appropriate systems approach 
can address such challenges during the planning process. With this history in 
mind, we urge you to consider the following in developing the Purpose & Need 
and scope of  alternatives for the NEC FUTURE study.
Purpose and Need
Driving Forces
Transportation in the Northeast Corridor is a complex sociotechnical system 
(CSS)4  in which several physical components and institutional actors, such as 
organizations and users, interact with each other in various ways, thus originating 
particular relationships and dynamics. According to the conceptual framework 
we developed for ITPS, this CSS is also subjected to several driving forces5, 
namely, key factors that are central to the behavior of  the system.
Of  particular importance in the NEC are economic growth, political support 
and political will, public perception of  the transportation system, congestion 
and capacity constraints, technological changes in transportation vehicles and 
infrastructure, multi-modal cooperation or competition, energy availability and 
fuel prices, funding sources for transportation projects and programs, changes in 
land use in metropolitan areas, environmental changes and global warming, and 
social attitude and concern towards the environment. 
Variations in these driving forces can provide clues to feasible situations in 
which the transportation system must reasonably be expected to perform, 
and thus may help us design a more robust system. Understanding that these 
driving forces evolve over time can also help us think about better strategies for 
deployment of  the system.
Goals, Objectives, and Performance Measures
A precondition for creating an appropriate set of  outcome-based goals, 
objectives, and performance measures includes having stakeholders provide 
input regarding how they feel good performance should be defined. This process 
will create a clear and uniform framework with which to evaluate the alternatives 
developed. Overall, we are encouraged that the NEC FUTURE scoping package 
has highlighted a broad set of  goals for improving rail service in the Northeast 
Corridor, including devoting attention to multi-modalism and sustainability 
issues within the initial scoping package6.  Based on our review of  the scoping 
package (particularly Section 2.3) as well our group’s previous work looking at 
high-speed rail in the Northeast Corridor, we submit the following comments 
regarding the development of  the goals, objectives and performance measures 
to be included with the “Purpose and Need” statements. 
4  For more on the study of CSS, see Professor Sussman’s lecture at http://techtv.mit.edu/videos/18975-
complexe-sociotechnical-systems-the-case-for-a-new-field-of-study
5  Schwartz, P. The Art of the Long View. 1996.
6  The following discussion is based on the NEC FUTURE Scoping Package (June 2012), and, in par-
ticular, Section 2.3 “Program Goals and Objectives.”
See Chapter 4 and 5 of the ITPS 
report for further details on driving 
forces.
For a more full enumeration of 
objectives and performance metrics, 
refer to Chapter 2 of the full report.
5Overall, we believe that there should be a clearer distinction between and 
greater clarity in the project goals, objectives, and performance measures. Goals 
should identify the desired future state of  the system; objectives should describe 
a measurable outcome that works toward a goal; and performance measures 
should gauge the success with which a given objective has been met (qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively). Section 2.3 “Program Goals and Objectives” indicates 
that there are “seven goals and objectives of  the overall program” and seemingly 
uses the two terms synonymously. However, it appears that the first level of  
bullets in this section indicates the programs goals, and the second level of  
bullets (appearing only under the goal “[d]evelop program alternatives that would 
provide attractive, competitive, high-quality passenger rail service that offers 
customers”) identifies measurable objectives. While we are generally supportive 
of  these seven goals, we believe that there needs to be greater clarity of  the 
objectives and performance measures, as faulty objectives and performance 
measures can lead to unintended consequences in the decision-making process. 
As intercity passenger rail requires other transportation services to be 
coordinated with it, including urban transportation to deal with first-mile/last-
mile mobility, as well as other intercity modes to provide complementary service 
to different markets, the Purpose and Need should include a set of  mode-
neutral and multi-modal program goals, objectives, and performance measures. 
Mode-neutral measures can allow for comparisons between modes, and multi-
modal measures allow for comparisons of  a traveler’s entire trip from origin-
to-destination between different alternatives. For example, “Competitive Travel 
Time” could perhaps be better defined as “Competitive Trip Times (from origin 
to destination).” This definition would allow for a better comparison between 
different modes of  transportation (e.g. air versus rail versus bus), as well as 
better comparison of  alternatives: for example, reducing trip time by facilitating 
transfers between public transit and rail at stations, versus increasing passenger 
rail speeds between stations. Although undertaking multi-modal comparisons 
poses challenges given the FRA’s jurisdiction of  commuter, intercity passenger, 
and freight rail, efforts should nonetheless be made during this planning process 
to keep the goals, objectives and performance measures as multi-modal as 
possible. Partnerships across modes, agencies, and governments within the NEC 
FUTURE planning process will support this multi-modal perspective.
One dimension that is missing from the listed goals in Section 2.3 and should 
be included in the subsequent statement of  Purpose and Need is a focus on 
the third “E” of  sustainability – social equity – in addition to the environment 
and the economy. Currently, business travelers dominate premium Acela service 
ridership7,  and prices on other Amtrak NEC services are also very high, albeit 
partly due to limited supply. Efforts should be made to make rail service more 
affordable and hence available to more travelers. This helps meets goals of  
social equity in the NEC. Although business travel is an important component 
of  NEC ridership currently and will be in the future, consideration should be 
given to other market segments that should benefit from new rail service. For 
example, an objective of  “affordability” could be defined with a corresponding 
performance measure such as the ratio between fare and income. In addition, 
some consideration should be given to facilitating the provision of  alternative 
7  Chen, Z. 2010. Who Ride the High Speed Rail in the United States – The Acela Express Case Study. 
Proceedings of the 2010 Joint Rail Conference, April 27-29, 2010, Urbana, IL, USA.
Connecting to USDOT 
Strategic Goals
The goals for the NEC FUTURE 
should be connected with the DOT’s 
strategic goals when possible, and 
in particular the three concerning 
sustainability:
• Economic Competitiveness
• Livable Communities
• Environmental Sustainability 
The Livable Communities strategic 
goal encourages aspects of social 
equity by promoting “investments 
that increase transportation choices 
and access to transportation 
services.”
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lower-cost services, such as trains with longer trip times, fewer amenities, tighter 
seating, and less space for baggage; or facilitating or providing lower-cost intercity 
bus service. Setting an “equity” goal will ensure that these considerations are 
taken into account when developing and evaluating the alternatives and that the 
benefits of  any significant infrastructure investments accrue to a larger portion 
of  the population. 
Social equity is also an important consideration within the political sphere, and is 
increasingly receiving political consideration within the context of  transportation 
in the NEC. For example, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) 
has put forth much effort to bring lower-cost intercity bus service to Union 
Station8.  If  improved passenger rail is perceived as being largely focused on 
improving business travel, it will likely be much more difficult to advance the 
NEC FUTURE program politically. Therefore, we feel that that “equity” should 
be a program goal so that there is a commitment to advance all three “E’s” of  the 
sustainability triple-bottom line and highlight these efforts to decision-makers. 
One other goal that is missing from the list in Section 2.3 is a focus on returning 
the NEC to a state of  good repair. While such a goal may be obvious to those 
individuals familiar with the NEC, it is important to emphasize taking care of  
the assets that already exist for passenger rail. The DOT also has a strategic goal 
promoting a return to the state of  good repair of  transportation infrastructure, 
and applying it to the NEC is particularly appropriate. 
We were pleased to see a focus on multi-modalism and some of  aspects of  
sustainability within the NEC FUTURE goals, and were also encouraged by the 
focus on pragmatism within the goal: “create a phased improvement program that 
reflects funding and financial limitations as well as the challenges of  improving 
the existing corridor under full operation.” We believe that these goals, with 
some refinement, should be explicitly included in the subsequent Statement 
of  Purpose and Need, along with mode-neutral and multi-modal measurable 
objectives and corresponding performance measures. As noted, a goal focusing 
on “social equity” should be included to bring this issue to the forefront.
Extending the above focus on implementation within pragmatic limitations, 
the following section addresses the limitations imposed by uncertainty—be it 
political, economic, or technical.
Uncertainty 
The planning and implementing of  HSR in the NEC is a decades-long process. 
As such, we recognize that the system is subject to uncertainties that planners 
and designers should be aware of. Recognizing that outcomes are uncertain and 
only known probabilistically may lead to the identification of  new opportunities 
and to improved performance of  the system over a broader range of  possible 
outcomes.
8  Norton, E.H. Norton Efforts Launch First Bus Service from Union Station. http://www.norton.house.
gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1500&Itemid=88.
The DOT’s State of Good Repair 
Goal also applies to the existing 
assets within the NEC.
7As with all complex, sociotechnical systems, “uncertainty is everywhere”. On 
one hand, we have uncertainties related to the inputs of  the system. We do 
not know the evolution of  the aforementioned driving forces, i.e. economic 
conditions, political will, technological change, regulatory framework, and so 
on. Furthermore, we have significant uncertainty related to important design 
parameters of  the system, such as future demand and system requirements. 
Designers should understand that point estimates of  demand forecasts are 
“always wrong”, and that there is no precedent of  international-quality HSR in 
the US that can give us a reference point for what the system’s requirements and 
costs are in this country9.  On the other hand, we have uncertainty related to the 
implementation of  the system. The actual pricing levels, ridership, and level of  
service of  the system are not known with certainty. The reaction of  stakeholders, 
such as operators of  other transportation modes, cannot be fully anticipated. 
The estimation and assessment of  wider economic and environmental impacts 
of  HSR is still a matter of  research.
That said, the planning process should not be paralyzed by the large uncertainties 
that confront it. Along with the downside risks, there is also great upside 
potential for passenger rail that could be realized because of  these uncertainties. 
Therefore, we urge that the evaluation of  the NEC alternatives account for 
ranges of  possible outcomes. The following section details a scenario-planning 
framework and flexibility-based approach to alternatives that can be used to 
mitigate inherent uncertainties in NEC transportation planning. 
Alternatives
Types of Alternatives
Defining the scope of  an EIS is inherently a boundaries problem; analysis 
inevitably simplifies the world and therefore the critical choice is how to define a 
system broadly enough such that the analysis of  impact yields adequate insight, 
while at the same time defining alternatives narrowly enough that they are 
feasible and implementable by the agency(ies) involved. The Northeast Corridor 
incorporates diverse ownership, regulatory, and planning structures, as well as 
dense multi-modal transportation infrastructure. The challenge posed by the EIS 
is to define alternatives that suitably capture the relevant variables, institutionally 
and physically, as well as across modes.
In scoping the EIS we urge you to consider multiple categories of  decision variables 
that can be used to define alternatives. The NEC FUTURE scoping package 
defines alternatives according to rail markets. This highlights the geographic 
and consumer-oriented aspects of  the system while giving less attention to 
the institutional management, multi-modal, and technological aspects. Figure I 
presents the alternatives analyzed by our research group.  Bundles of  cascading 
decisions are organized hierarchically as a one way of  generating alternatives 
for study. International-quality refers to developing an HSR system similar in 
9  For example, Bain (2009) found that the actual traffic volumes during the first year of operation of 104 
international toll roads fell between 14% and 151% of the traffic volume predicted by traffic and revenue 
studies. Furthermore, this study found that, on average, actual traffic volumes turned out to be only 77% 
of the predicted traffic demand.
Bain, R. 2009. Error and optimism bias in toll road traffic forecasts. Transportation, 36(5): 469-482.
See Chapter 3 of the ITPS report 
for more on this approach to 
defining strategic alternatives.
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service quality to the Japanese Shinkansen or the French TGV on a primarily 
dedicated track alignment. Incremental HSR refers to upgrading the existing 
NEC alignment gradually to reduce trip times. Lower down, according to this 
approach to alternatives-definition, are decisions regarding the infrastructure 
ownership and competitive structure of  operations—but that is not to say that 
these are less important decisions. They will, in fact, be as critical to the success 
of  NEC rail as decisions regarding physical infrastructure investment.
The scoping package also defined one of  the NEC FUTURE goals as 
“developing a rail network…[that] complements planned investment in other 
modes.” The alternatives must be defined in broad enough terms to capture 
intermodal effects. For example, they should address the implications of  air-
rail10 or motor vehicle-rail competition for greenhouse gas emissions. Related to 
intermodal effects are issues of  intermodal connectivity and livability, the latter 
one of  USDOT’s five strategic goals. The alternatives should be defined so as 
to capture door-to-door access to stations, as well as land use impacts that affect 
the safety, economic competitiveness, and health11 of  neighborhoods served by 
HSR.
10  R. Clewlow, Sussman J., Balakrishnan H., Interaction of High-Speed Rail and Aviation: Exploring 
Air-Rail Connectivity, Journal of the Transportation Research Board, Issue 2266, 2012.
11  Health relates to both active transportation options, i.e. walking and biking, and air quality. See 
FHWA Livability and Health: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/livability/fact_sheets/transandhealth.cfm
Figure II A technology and organizationally driven approach to defining NEC alternatives
9Finally, while it is tempting for a project at this scale to think according to top-
down national-policy approaches, the realities of  federal funding and political 
uncertainties make bottom-up approaches increasingly important. Therefore, the 
EIS should recognize the importance of  greater stakeholder involvement from 
state and local governments and regional businesses — not only in planning, but 
also in finance, management, and implementation. For example, the Business 
Alliance for Northeast Mobility is one group already taking steps towards 
defining what a city-driven approach to NEC Rail might be. In addition, Lee12 
highlighted how a “community-driven approach” allowed for the development 
of  a “locally accepted” alternative for the California High-Speed Rail project. 
Flexibility
Given the significant uncertainties associated with forecasting many driving 
factors (such as the economy or the political context), the success of  an 
alternative is difficult to predict. The success of  HSR is particularly susceptible 
to these uncertainties due to the high capital costs (on the order of  $100 billion 
for the NEC) and decades-long timelines that will ultimately be required to 
implement the system. While there may be approaches taken that are intended 
to reduce these uncertainties, some are inevitable. As a result, NEC FUTURE 
should explore how flexibility can be used to achieve better outcomes for HSR, 
by allowing decision-makers the ability to respond dynamically to different 
realizations of  the future. In particular, we propose a joint scenario-planning 
and real-options framework to deal with the uncertainty that planning in the 
NEC faces.
Rather than taking at face value one set of  predictions about the future, scenario 
planning involves the telling of  multiple “stories about the way the world might turn 
out.” 13 Scenarios should not be mistaken for “predictions of  the future” nor 
extrapolations of  the past. They are “tools for ordering one’s perception about 
alternative future environments in which one’s decision might be played out”; 
“might be rational”; and should “have to do with the driving forces of  the 
system”. In addition, scenarios “can help inform decisions that involve high 
stakes and poorly characterized uncertainty…[They can] help inform specific 
decisions, or can provide inputs to assessments, models that need specification of  
potential future conditions…[They can] also provide various forms of  indirect 
decision support, such as clarifying an issue’s importance, framing a decision 
agenda, shaking up habitual thinking, stimulating creativity, clarifying points of  
agreement and disagreement, identifying and engaging needed participants, or 
providing a structure for analysis of  potential future decisions.”14  
12  Lee, M. 2012. Community Planning & High Speed Rail: “A Square Peg in a Round Hole?” UIC 
HIGHSPEED: 8th World Congress on High Speed Rail, Philadelphia, PA, July 10-13, 2012.
13  E.A. Parson, et al. Global-Change Scenarios: Their Development and Use. 2007.
14  P. Schwartz. The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World. Doubleday: 
New York, NY, 1996.
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Note that it is not necessary to develop scenarios representative of  each plausible 
future situation in order to gain some insights about the performance of  the 
alternatives under future uncertainties. We recommend the choice of  a small 
number of  scenarios (3 to 5) as the best way to test the timing and level of  
investment in HSR for the NEC under a diverse set of  “positive” and “negative” 
future situations. A plausible set of  scenarios is proposed in the Transportation 
in the Northeast Corridor of  the U.S. report developed by our group.
A real option15  is the “the right, but not the obligation, [for the option holder] to take some 
action at a future date at a predetermined price.”16  In other words, a potential option 
holder (decision-maker) can pay more now (for example, investing greater funds, 
planning effort, or initial institutional steps) in order to create or maintain the 
possibility of  taking a potential action in the future—as the future evolves and 
uncertainty gradually resolves into greater certainty.
Previous work carried out by our research group17,  shows that the strict 
adherence to one definition of  an alternative—e.g. developing international-
quality HSR in the NEC—does not lend itself  to a scenario with postponed 
investment, whereas alternatives considering greater flexibility might allow a 
gradual transition between incremental and international-quality HSR. Potential 
opportunities to design-in flexibility in the alternatives have been identified. The 
flexibilities identified relate to the decision hierarchy (presented in Figure I) used 
to develop our bundles of  strategic alternatives .
Intermodal connectivity flexibility
Full intermodal cooperation and coordination will likely not be achieved between 
modes immediately; however, it will be important to create opportunities for 
it to occur, even if  it is not exercised immediately. In particular, airports and 
airlines might initially be resistant to international-quality HSR (because of  the 
potential loss of  short-haul air travelers), but efforts should be made to develop 
cooperation with these groups; good physical connectivity between airports and 
the rail system can have positive implication for both industries. While we are 
not advocating for airport high-speed rail stations at all cost, we emphasize that 
airlines and airports may have different views pre- and post-introduction of  
HSR, and that it is important to take a longer run view when planning these 
stations. 
15  R. de Neufville, Scholtes, S. Flexibility in Engineering Design. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011.
16  J.B. McConnell. A Life-Cycle Flexibility Framework for Designing, Evaluating and Managing 
“Complex” Real Options: Case Studies in Urban Transportation and Aircraft Systems. MIT PhD disserta-
tion, 2007.
17  Pena-Alcaraz M., Carlson S.J., Archila A.F., Stein N., Sussman J., “Analysis of High-Speed Rail 
Implementation Alternatives in the Northeast Corridor: the Role of Institutional and Technological Flex-
ibility”, submitted to TRB. http://esd.mit.edu/WPS/2012/esd-wp-2012-23.pdf.
See Chapters 6 and 7 of the ITPS 
report for a more detailed account 
of these scenarios.
For a description of how the 
flexibilities discussed in the next 
sections would play out under 
different hypothetical scenarios, 
refer to Chapter 7 of the ITPS 
report.
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For example, the two main proposals for international-quality HSR in the 
NEC both include additional airport stops along their alignments: Amtrak’s18 
proposal contains an additional airport stop at New York Westchester County 
White Plains Airport (HPN)19 and Philadelphia International Airport (PHL). 
PennDesign’s20 study contains an additional stop at Long Island MacArthur 
Airport (ISP), JFK International Airport in New York (JFK) and PHL. Although 
connecting these airports to the railway alignment is subject to trade-offs (both 
in terms of  what airports and stations to provide, and certainly cost), these 
intermodal connections would provide airlines and the HSR operator(s) reason 
to pursue cooperation agreements (such as codeshare train trips, for example). 
The same level integration should be pursued with buses, metro, regional trains, 
and pedestrian and bicycle connectivity in the city context. Centrally located 
stops can go a long way to achieving good accessibility without automobile 
dependence.
Institutional flexibility
Another subject of  debate regarding HSR in the NEC is the institutional structure 
that should be responsible for the implementation of  infrastructure upgrades and 
ultimately operations. Amtrak currently owns most of  the NEC infrastructure 
and already operates higher-speed Acela service, and therefore could begin 
the process of  upgrading NEC infrastructure and service immediately21.Other 
stakeholders, like commuter rail operators, may prefer the implementation of  an 
alternative public ownership structure22. Implementing a “regional public benefit 
corporation”23 structure could take months if  not years of  negotiations to set 
up, however, which would hold up improvements to HSR service in the NEC. 
The implementation plan for the NEC must detail not only physical upgrades 
to the system but must also ensure that an institutional structure is in place that 
can appropriately manage the significant capital investment projects that will be 
required and balance the needs of  all NEC users. While Amtrak has the advantage 
of  being already in place and is able to begin implementing any upgrades relatively 
quickly, it may be possible to design-in flexibility within Amtrak that allows 
for (but does not require) a transition into a new organizational structure. An 
example of  institutional flexibility includes separating NEC Infrastructure and 
Operations into separate business lines (as Amtrak is proposing to do), such that 
in the future, it is relatively easier to separate these business lines into a separate 
organization, such as the regional-public benefit corporation mentioned above.24 
Some of  this flexibility could be designed-in immediately, while some of  it could 
be included at a later date. Additionally, some of  the flexibility (such as Amtrak’s 
18  Amtrak, Vision for High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor, Washington, DC., 2010.
19  Amtrak has removed this stop in its 2012 update report, but is still in discussion with local commu-
nity stakeholders.
20  PennDesign, High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Megaregion: From Vision to Reality, Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania School of Design, 2011.
21  D.L. Roth, Aggarwala R.T. Whose railroad is this, anyway? Opportunities and challenges in regional-
izing the Northeast Corridor, in Transportation Research Records: Journal of the Transportation Research 
Board, No. 1785, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2002.
22  L.S. Thompson. Options for the Federal Ownership of Northeast Corridor (NEC) Infrastructure. 
2005.
23 PennDesign, High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Megaregion: From Vision to Reality. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania School of Design, 2011.
24  Amtrak. 2011. Amtrak Strategic Plan FY 2011 – FY2015.
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strategy to implement business lines for NEC Infrastructure and Investment 
Development and NEC Operations)25 presented could also have inherent value, 
even if  it is never exercised. 
There would be advantages and disadvantages to a flexible approach. The 
first advantage is that Amtrak could begin upgrading infrastructure almost 
immediately. At the same time, the flexibility in the approach would provide 
Amtrak and other decision-makers some ability to redefine their operation if  they 
choose to exercise that institutional option. If  an alternative public-ownership 
structure were pursued immediately, years might go by before any actual upgrades 
(incremental or otherwise) take place on the NEC. In addition, the flexibility 
allows decision-makers to gradually change the ownership structure of  the NEC 
if  needed and test additional reforms without having to jump completely to a 
radically different ownership structure. 
There are some disadvantages to this approach, however. For example, although 
many of  the proposals above have inherent value, designing-in flexibility adds 
cost. For instance, there is the added cost of  separating Amtrak into separate 
business lines based on NEC operations that may not be needed (but it would 
substantially reduce the cost of  implementing a new institution if  needed from 
scratch, in terms of  time, political willingness, money, etc.). Note that this section 
does not opine whether Amtrak should or should not develop international-
quality HSR in the NEC; we simply recognize the fact that Amtrak already owns 
most of  the NEC infrastructure and operates Acela services, as well as the 
possibility of  having different ownership formulations.
Technological flexibility
Another type of  flexibility that could be designed-into the bundles is the option 
to change from implementing international-quality HSR to incremental HSR 
and vice-versa (or between other alternatives) as future economic or political 
conditions demand. 
If  an incremental HSR alternative were implemented, a flexible approach would 
focus on upgrades that would benefit both international-quality and incremental 
HSR systems. Some examples of  these projects include expanding the capacity 
of  New York Penn Station and its access tunnels and increasing the capacity 
of  Boston South Station. In addition to upgrading the NEC infrastructure 
incrementally, the planning, permitting and design processes associated with 
international-quality HSR could be pursued so that future opportunities would 
not be delayed (as much) by regulatory and design issues. 
If  an international-quality HSR alternative were chosen initially, flexibility could 
be designed-in by allowing the construction of  the new alignment in phases, 
connecting it with the existing system, and ensuring trains are interoperable 
on both the new and old system. For example, a section from New York to 
Philadelphia could be constructed first. If  demand were much lower than 
expected, the infrastructure owner could avoid losses associated with a locked-in 
25  Amtrak. 2011. Amtrak Strategic Plan FY 2011 – FY2015.
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decision to build the entire system at once. There would still be inherent value 
to this construction as trains would be able to run on the new alignment for part 
of  the route (from Philadelphia to New York, for example), and thus overall 
trip time would be reduced. If  demand were higher than expected, then the new 
riders of  the HSR system would represent a new stakeholder group who could 
advocate for the further expansion of  the system. Amtrak’s Vision for HSR26 
presents a potential phasing scheme in their report. 
In summary, under circumstances of  low transportation demand or low 
economic growth, providing flexibility allows for a transition from a more 
ambitious to a less ambitious alternative (in terms of  international-quality 
standards). Conversely, under circumstances of  significant economic growth 
and well-received upgrades of  the railway system, flexibility would faciliate a 
change from the less ambitious to international-quality HSR alternative . Again, 
there are risks and costs associated with implementing flexibility into the system 
that should be explicitly considered. Flexibility therefore helps minimize the 
downside risks, while still providing opportunities to capture the benefits of  
greater than expected results.  
Conclusion
Again, we thank you for this opportunity to comment on the scoping process 
for the forthcoming NEC FUTURE Tier I EIS as you embark on this study 
process. 
We hope that consideration for the corridor’s history, interwoven with an 
understanding of  the importance of  reliable performance measures, and 
coupled with recognition of  the uncertainty involved, will help initiate the NEC 
FUTURE project. Then, understanding the types of  strategic alternatives and 
the flexibility needed will allow it to move forward effectively.
Further, we offer our group’s assistance to the process. Whether via participation 
in a forum here in Boston, or via directed research efforts, we would be happy 
to work with the FRA and USDOT to further study the NEC. As part of  
an academic institution, we can provide a “level-playing field” for comparing 
various ways forward. We are indeed excited about what the future will bring the 
NEC, and we look forward to playing a role in that process.
26   Amtrak, Vision for High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor. Washington, DC., 2010.
Flexibility Application
More details about the design of 
the alternatives, flexibility, and 
possible framework to consider 
uncertainty can be found in the 
reports developed by the research 
group; refer to Chapter 3, 6 and 
7 of the ITPS report and the paper 
“Analysis of High-Speed Rail 
Implementation Alternatives in 
the Northeast Corridor: the Role 
of Institutional and Technological 
Flexibility,” available here:  http://esd.
mit.edu/WPS/2012/esd-wp-2012-23.pdf.
